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Abstract
The concept of granular computing is applied to Aristotle's categorical syllogism.
Such kind of reasoning is called granular reasoning in this paper. For the purpose,
two operations called zooming in & out is introduced to reconstruct granules of
possible worlds.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Lin[2], Skowron[9], and others have developed granular computing
based on rough set theory (Pawlak [6,7]) and many researchers expect that it
provides a new paradigm of computing. In this paper, by granular reasoning,
we mean some mechanism for reasoning using granular computing. We de-
scribed in [3] a possible step for granular reasoning using ltration in modal
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logic[1]. Then, in [5], we applied the idea to propositional reasoning using
two operations called zooming in & out proposed in [4]. This paper aims to
provide the next step for formulating granularity of an aspect of Aristotle's
syllogism.
But why now Aristotle? In our opinion, Aristotle's categorical syllogism
may capture the essence of human ordinary reasoning, not of mathematical
reasoning. We cannot forget the fact that the great work of F regeprovides a
precise expression of mathematical inference, but when it was applied to h u-
man ordinary reasoning, we had to face some very diÆcult problems including
the frame problem. Frege analyzed a universal sentence '(All) s is p' using his
inv en tionuniversal quantier as 8x(s(x) ! p(x)). His analysis is undoubt-
edly correct and was the motive power of a great deal of brilliant results in
mathematical logic since the 20th century. At the same time, nevertheless,
his analysis was too much detailed for human beings, in general, to carry out
their ordinary reasoning in his fashion. It is well-known that Frege analyzed
sentences in a structure of 'individual|predicate,' while Aristotle's structure
was 'subject|predicate.' Clearly, however, we do not hav e to analyze every
concept at the level of individuals every time for ordinary reasoning. F rege
requires us complete analysis, which may cause intractability, while the basis
of Aristotle's logic seems to be granules.
This paper aims to give a step for describing Aristotle's syllogism in a
way of granular computing. Let M = <U; I> be a structure for predicate
logic, where U is a domain and I is an interpretation. In rough set theory,
sentences in predicate logic is often represented in a Kripke-st ylemodel M,
where a domain and predicate symbols are regarded as a set of worlds and
atomic sentences, respectively, and thereby we hav e, for example, the following
correspondence
M j= mortal(socrates) i M; socrates j= mortal: (1)
Here make a quotient model M=
human
using an equivalence relation 
human
which means two worlds are equivalent just in case they both hav e the prop-
erty 'human' in common. Then one equivalent class must be the set of humans
denoted b yI(human), where I is an interpretation in predicate logic. F or ex-
ample, I(human)=[socrates]

human
holds by taking socrates as a representative
element. Thus, in the quotient model, for instance, we may write
M=
human
; I(human) j= mortal: (2)
Can we see this expression (2 )as corresponding to Aristotle's analyses '(All)
human is mortal' ? This may suggest a possible way of formulating higher-order
predicate expressions lik e mortal(human) under, for instance, the following
correspondence: for some structure M
0
,
M
0
j= mortal(human)
?
i M=
human
; I(human) j= mortal;
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which is parallel to formula (1). This is the starting point for our research.
Then, in such an approach, we need reasoning process using reconstruction of
models. We call such operations 'zooming in & out' in [4], which is dened
based on some idea of granularity in troduced to give a logical foundation of
local and global worlds in semantic elds[8]. Such operators provides us a way
of changing our viewpoint moving from global to local and vice verse. In this
paper, using such operations of zooming in & out, we try to describe Aristotle's
categorical syllogism as a small step for formulating granular reasoning.
2 Granules of Possible Worlds
Given a countably innite set of atomic sentences P, a language L
BL
(P)
for propositional logic of belief is formed as the least set of sentences from
P with the well-known set of connectives with a modal operator B(belief)
b y the usual formation rules. A sentence is called non-modal if it does not
contain any occurrence of B. A Kripke model is a tuple M=<U;R; V >,
where W is a non-empty set of (possible) worlds, R is a binary relation
on W , and V is a valuation for every atomic sentence p at every world x.
Dene M; x j= p i V (p; x)=1. The relationship j= is extended for every
compound sentence in the usual way. The truth set of p in M is dene as
kpk =fx 2 U jM; x j= pg. A sentence p is said to be valid in M, written
M j= p, just in case kpk = U .
Given P, let U be a non-empty subset
5
of 2 . We call any subset in U an
elementary world in U . Then, for an atomic sentence p inP and an elementary
world x in U , a valuation V is naturally dened b yV (p; x)=1 i p2x. When
a binary relation R is given on U , we hav e a Kripke model M=<U;R; V >.
When we are concerned only with nite sentences, the set U is, in general,
large for us. Hence we need some way of granularizing U . Our proposal in
a series of papers[3,4,5] is to make a quotient set whose elements we regard
as granules of possible worlds. Suppose we are concerned with a set   of
non-modal sentences. Let P
 
=P\sub( ), where sub( ) is the union of the
sets of subsentences of each sentence in  . Then, we can dene an agreement
relation 
 
b y x
 
y i 8p2P
 
[V (p; x)=V (p; y)]. The relation becomes an
equivalence relation and induces the quotient set U
 
df
=U=
 
. We regard its
(non-empty) elements as the granules of possible worlds under  . A new
valuation is given by V
 
(p; X)=1 i p2\X, for p inP
 
andX in U
 
. According
to [1], when a relationR is given on U , assume we hav e an accessibility relation
R
0
on U
 
satisfying (a) if xRy then [x]

 
R
0
[y]

 
, (b) if [x]

 
R
0
[y]

 
then
M; x j= Bp)M; y j= p, for every sentence Bp in  , and (c) if [x]

 
R
0
[y]

 
thenM; y j= p)M; x j= :B:p, for every sentence :B:p in  , then the model
M
R
0
 
=<U
 
; R
0
; V
 
> is called a ltr ationthrough sub( ).
5
More generally, w e ma y tak e amultisubset of 2 as a set of possible worlds.
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3 Zooming In & Out
3.1 Zooming In & Out on Sets of Worlds.
Let   be a set of non-modal sentences we are concerned with at a given time.
It is called a focus at the time. When we mov e our viewpoint from one focus
to another along time, we must reconstruct the set of granularized possible
worlds. Let   be the current focus and  be the next focus we will mov e to.
First we consider the simpler two nested cases.
(a) When P
 
P

, we need granularization, which is represented b ya map-
ping I
 

: U
 
!U

, called a zooming in from   to , where, for any X in U
 
,
I
 

(X)
df
=fx 2 U j x\P

=(\X)\P

g.
(b) When P
 
P

, we need an inv erse operation of granularization O
 

:
U
 
!2
U

, called a zooming out from   to , where, for any X in U
 
, O
 

(X)
df
=
fY 2 U

j (\Y )\P
 
=\Xg.
(c) For non-nested two sets  , , the movement from   to  can be repre-
sented using combination of 'zooming out & in' as I
 [

ÆO
 
 [
: U
 
! 2
U

.
3.2 Extending zooming in & out on models.
We extend the two operations so that they can be applied to models. Again
let   and  be the current and the next focus, respectively. Given a model
M
 
=<U
 
; R
 
; V
 
>, we dene, for X in U
 
, B
 
(X)
df
=fX
0
2 U
 
j XR
 
X
0
g. We
abbreviate it to B
 
, when B
 
(X)=B
 
(X
0
) foran y X;X
0
in U .
(a) When  , a zo oming in ofM
 
through  is a tuple I
 

(M
 
)
df
=<U

; R

;
V

>, where Y
i
R

Y
j
i Y
j
2 I
 

([fB
 
(X) j X2U
 
and I
 

(X)=Y
i
g).
(b) When  , a zo oming out ofM
 
through  is a tupleO
 

(M
 
)
df
=<U

; R

;
V

>, where Y
i
R

Y
j
i Y
j
2O
 

(B
 
((O
 

)
 1
(Y
i
))).
(c) Non-nested cases are described using a merging of two modelsM
 
andM

.
When P
 
=P

, their mergingM
 
ÆM

is <U
 
; R; V
 
>, where X
i
RX
j
i X
j
2
B
 
(X
i
)\B

(X
i
). The merging Æ is extended for the cases that P
 
6=P

: If
P
 
P

, then M
 
ÆM

df
= M
 
ÆO

 
(M

), else if P
 
P

, then M
 
ÆM

df
=
O
 

(M
 
)ÆM

, else M
 
ÆM

df
=O
 
 [
(M
 
)ÆO

 [
(M

). The last case of merg-
ing is used for non-nested cases.
4 Aristotle's Syllogism and Granularity
4.1 Preliminaries
We conne ourselves to a monadic predicate logic. Let P be a non-empty
set of predicate symbols of arity 1 with > and ?. Let C be a non-empty
set of constants. F ora structure M=<U; I> for a monadic predicate logic,
where U is a domain and I is an interpretation, dene a mapping  : U!2 b y
 (x)=fp 2 P j I(x)2I(p)g. Since, when  is not injective, we can replace U
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b yU= , for simplicity, if we assume  is an injection, thus any individual can
be identied with its corresponding element
6
in 2 . Then we can formulate
a model for logic of relative modality (cf.[1]) asM=<U; fB
p
g
p2
; V >, where
B
p
=I(p) and V is a valuation dened b yV (p; a)=1 i a2I(p) for a predicate
symbol p and a in U . >From B
p
, we can recover a binary relation R
p
on U
b yaR
p
b i b 2 B
p
, and th usM is a Kripke model. Note that kpk = I(p).
For an atomic sentence p(c) in a monadic predicate logic, we hav e obviously
M j= p(c) i M; a j= p; (where I(c)=a.)
For two predicate symbols s and p, we hav e the follo wing two lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 M j= [s]p i B
s
 kpk i I(s)  I(p).
Lemma 4.2 M j= <s>p i B
s
\ kpk 6= ; i I(s) \ I(p) 6= ;.
F orsimplicity,we assume that I : C ! U is a bijection, thus we identify
any constant with its corresponding element I(c) in U .
4.2 Representation of Sentences
Consider representation of the four basic types of sentences in a Kripke model.
Universal sentences
8
<
:
A : All s is p.
E : No s is p.
P articular sentences
8
<
:
I : Some s is p.
O : Some s is not p.
4.2.1 Universal Sentences and Lower Zooming In
First we consider translation of a universal sentence of type A like 'All human
is mortal' into the above kind of Kripke models. Since Frege's achievement, it
is well known that a universal sentence 'All s is p' is translated into a predicate
logic as 8x(s(x)!p(x)). Given M=<U; I>, because M j= 8x(s(x)!p(x)) i I(s)
I(p), we hav eM j= 8x(s(x) ! p(x)) iM j= [s]p, and thus
Lemma 4.3 'All s is p' is true i M j= [s]p.
Consider a zo oming in ofM through fs; pg: M
s;p
df
=I
s;p
(M)=<U
s;p
; fB
q
s;p
g
q2
;
V
s;p
>. Note thatB
q
s;p
=I
s;p
(B
q
). In general, U
s;p
=fX
1
; X
2
; X
3
; X
4
g, whereX
1
=
I(s)\I(p), X
2
=I(s)\I(p)
C
, X
3
=I(s)
C
\I(p), X
4
=I(s)
C
\I(p)
C
. If I(s)I(p),
then X
2
=;, thus U
s;p
=fX
1
; X
3
; X
4
g. Then B
s
s;p
=fX
1
gfX
1
; X
3
g=kpk
s;p
.
The conv erse is also shown. Hence we hav eM j= [s]p iM
s;p
j= [s]p and thus,
Lemma 4.4 'All s is p' is true i M
s;p
j= [s]p.
6
Or we identify x with a multisubset of 2 .
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Consider further zooming in. We make a quotient set U
s
=U=R
s
=fI(s),
I(s)
C
g. When I(s)I(p), we hav e I(s) R
s
(I(p)), and thus we can construct
the lower Zooming in fromM
s
using relative ltration[3].
Denition 4.5 The lower zooming in of M
s;p
through fsg is a tuple M
s
df
=
I
s;p
s
(M
s;p
)=<U
s
; fB
q
s
g
q2
; V
s
>, where V
s
(p; X)=1 i XR
s
(I(p)), for X 2
U
s
.
Lemma 4.6 'All s is p' is true i M
s
; I(s) j= p.
Example 4.7 Let us consider a structure <U; I> where 'All human is mortal,'
that is, 8x(human(x)!mortal(x)) is true, which means that, in the structure,
I(human)I(mortal) holds. F or the reason of space, we sometimes abbreviate
human and mortal as h and m, respectively . We construct a Kripke model
M=<U; fB
q
g
q2
; V >, where V is given, for instance, by the left-hand side of
table in Fig.1. Since B
h
=I(human)I(mortal), we hav eM j= [human]mortal.
Next we make a zooming in of M through fh;mg asM
h;m
=<U
h;m
; fB
q
h;m
g
q2
;
V
h;m
>, where U
h;m
=f[a
i
]
h;m
; [b
i
]
h;m
; [c
i
]
h;m
g and V
h;m
is given in the left-hand
side table in Fig.1. Note thatB
h
h;m
=f[a
i
]
h;m
g and kmortalk
h;m
=f[a
i
]
h;m
; [b
i
]
h;m
g.
M human mortal   
U a
i
1 1
   I
fh;mg
M
h;m
human mortal   
a
j
1 1   ! U
h;m
[a
i
]
h;m
1 1
b
i
0 1 Zooming in [b
i
]
h;m
0 1
   [c
i
]
h;m
0 0
b
j
0 1
c
i
0 0
  
c
j
0 0
Fig. 1. Zooming in of M through fhuman;mortalg
Then, we hav eM
h;m
j= [human]mortal. Finally we make the lower zooming
in of M
h;m
through fhg as M
h
=<U
h
; fB
q
h
g
q2
; V
h
>, where U
h
=fI(human),
I(human)
C
g with I(human)= [a
i
]
fh;mg
and I(human)
C
=[b
i
]
h;m
[[c
i
]
h;m
and V
h
is giv enb y the right-hand side table in Fig.2. Since R
h
(I(mortal))=[a
i
]
h;m
=
I(human), we hav eM
h
; I(human) j= mortal.
F or a universal sentence of type E lik e'No human is Flying', we hav e similar
results:
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M
h;m
human mortal    I
h;m
h
M
h
human mortal   
U
h;m
[a
i
]
h;m
1 1  ! U
h
I(human) 1 1
[b
i
]
h;m
0 1 Low er I(human)
C
0 0
[c
i
]
h;m
0 0 zooming in
Fig. 2. Low er zooming in ofM
h;m
through fhg.
Lemma 4.8 'No s is p' is true i M j= [s]:p.
Lemma 4.9 'No s is p' is true i M
s;p
j= [s]:p. (Zooming in)
Lemma 4.10 'No s is p' is true i M
s
; I(s) j= :p. (Lower zooming in)
4.2.2 Particular Sentences and Upper Zooming In
Next we consider translation of a particular sentence of type I lik e 'Some
human is genius' in to the kind of Kripke models. Also since F rege,it is well
known that 'Some s is p' is translated into a predicate logic as 9x(s(x) ^
p(x)). BecauseM j= 9x(s(x)^p(x)) i I(s)\I(p) 6= ;, we hav eM j= 9x(s(x)^
p(x)) iM j= <s>p, and thus
Lemma 4.11 'Some s is p' is true i M j= <s>p.
F or azo oming in ofM through fs; pg, we hav eM j= <s>p i M
s;p
j= <s>p,
Lemma 4.12 'Some s is p' is true i M
s;p
j= <s>p.
Again let us consider further zooming in. Here we make a quotient set
U
s
=U=R
s
=fI(s); I(s)
C
g, then, b yI(s)\I(p)6=;, we hav e I(s)R
s
(I(p)), and
then, we construct the upper Zooming in of M
s;p
through fsg.
Denition 4.13 The upper zooming in of M
s;p
through fsg is a tupleM
s
df
=
I
s;p
s
(M
s;p
)=<U
s
; fB
q
s
g
q2
; V
s
>, where V
s
(p; X)=1 i XR
s
(I(p)), forX2U
s
.
Lemma 4.14 'Some s is p' is true i M
s
; I(s) j= p.
Example 4.15 Consider a structure <U; I>, where 'Some human is genius,'
i.e., 9x(human(x)^genius(x)) is true, which means, in the structure, I(human)
\I(genius) 6=; holds. Then we construct a Kripke model M=<U; fB
q
g
q2
; V >,
where V is given, for instance, by the left-hand side table in Fig.3. Since B
h
\
kgeniusk 6=;, we hav eM j= <human>genius. For a zooming in of M through
fh; gg as M
h;g
=<U
h;g
; fB
q
h;g
g
q2
; V
h;g
>, where U
h;g
=f[a
i
]
h;g
; [b
i
]
h;g
; [c
i
]
h;g
g, and
V
h;g
is given by the right-hand side table in Fig.3. Because B
h
h;g
=f[a
i
]
h;g
; [b
i
]
h;g
g
and kgenius)k
h;g
=f[a
i
]
h;g
; [c
i
]
h;g
g, we hav eM
h;g
j= <human>genius: Finally
for the upper zooming in ofM
h;g
through fhg, i.e.,M
h
=<U
h
; fB
q
h
g
q2
; V
h
>,
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M human genius   
U a
i
1 1
   I
fh;gg
M
h;g
human genius   
a
j
1 1  ! U
h;g
[a
i
]
h;g
1 1
b
i
1 0 Zooming in [b
i
]
h;g
1 0
   [c
i
]
h;g
0 1
b
j
1 0 [d
i
]
h;g
0 0
c
i
0 1
  
c
j
0 1
d
i
0 0
  
d
j
0 0
Fig. 3. Zooming in of M through fhuman; geniusg.
where U
h
=fI(human); I(human)
C
g with I(human) =[a
i
]
h;g
[[c
i
]
h;g
and I(human)
C
=[c
i
]
h;g
[ [d
i
]
h;g
and V
h
is given b y the right-hand side table in Fig.4. Hence
M
h;g
human genius   
U
h;g
[a
i
]
h;g
1 1 I
h;g
h
M
h
human genius   
[b
i
]
h;g
1 0  ! U
h
I(human) 1 1
[c
i
]
h;g
0 1 (Upper zooming in) I(human)
C
0 1
[d
i
]
h;g
0 0
Fig. 4. Upper zooming in of M
fh;gg
through fhumang.
we hav eM
h
; I(human) j= genius.
F ora universal sentence of type O like 'Some human is not genius,' we
hav e similar results:
Lemma 4.16 'Some s is not p' is true iM j= <s>:p.
Lemma 4.17 'Some s is not p' is true iM
s;p
j= <s>:p. (Zooming in)
Lemma 4.18 'Some s is not p' is true iM
s
; I(s) j= :p.(Upper zooming in)
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4.3 Conversion
Representation of several conv ersion rules is trivial:
Some s is p. i Some p is s. No s is p. i No p is s.
M
s;p
j= <s>p i M
s;p
j= <p>s M
s;p
j= [s]:p i M
s;p
j= [p]:s
M
s
; I(s) j= p i M
p
; I(p) j= s M
s
; I(s) j= :p i M
p
; I(p) j= :s
Not (All s is p). i Some s is not p. Not (Some s is p). i No s is p.
M
s;p
j= :[s]p i M
s;p
j= <s>:p M
s;p
j= <s>p i M
s;p
j= [s]:p
M
s
; I(s) 6j= p i M
s
; I(s) j= :p M
s
; I(s) 6j= p i M
s
; I(s) j= :p
4.4 Categorical Syllogism
In contrast with Subsection 4.2, here we take a top-down approach, i.e., with-
out describing the details of an underlying model M, we simply assume the
existence of such basic model so that we can perform reasoning process. F or
example, when we are giv ena universal sentence 'All s is p,' we at once con-
struct a model M
s;p
(or their lower model) and we assume it is a result of
zooming in ofM through fs; pg for someM. There are four basic patterns of
syllogism in Aristotle's syllogism such as BARBARA, CELARENT, DARII,
and FARIO. Here we illustrate the inference process of the rst pattern in our
setting. The form of BARBARA and its translation are given b y
BARBARA (Zooming in) (Lower zooming in)
All m is p. M
m;p
j= [m]p M
m
; I(m) j= p I(m)  R
m
(I(p))
All s is m. M
s;m
j= [s]m M
s
; I(s) j= m I(s)  R
s
(I(m))
All s is p M
s;p
j= [s]p M
s
; I(s) j= p I(s)  R
s
(I(p))
First we describe the (simple) zooming in case. By the premises we can assume
the follo wing two models:
M
1
m;p
m p    M
2
s;m
s m   
U
m;p
I(m) \ I(p) 1 1 U
s;m
I(s) \ I(m) 1 1
I(m) \ I(p)
C
(discarded) I(s) \ I(m)
C
(discarded)
I(m)
C
\ I(p) 0 1 I(s)
C
\ I(m) 0 1
I(m)
C
\ I(p)
C
0 0 I(s)
C
\ I(m)
C
0 0
where the second rows in each valuation are discarded because I(m)\I(p)
C
=;
and I(s)\I(m)
C
=; (we can assume they do not exist b y the premises). T o
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merge the two models, we make a zooming out of each model through fs;m; pg:
M
1
s;m;p
df
=O
fm;pg
fs;m;pg
(M
1
m;p
) M
2
s;m;p
df
=O
fs;mg
fs;m;pg
(M
2
s;m
)
s m p    s m p   
U
s;m;p
I(s) \ I(m) \ I(p) 1 1 1 1 1 1
I(s) \ I(m) \ I(p)
C
(discarded) 1 1 0
I(s) \ I(m)
C
\ I(p) 1 1 0 (discarded)
I(s) \ I(m)
C
\ I(p)
C
1 0 0 (discarded)
I(s)
C
\ I(m) \ I(p) 0 1 1 0 1 1
I(s)
C
\ I(m) \ I(p)
C
(discarded) 0 0 1
I(s)
C
\ I(m)
C
\ I(p) 0 0 1 0 0 1
I(s)
C
\ I(m)
C
\ I(p)
C
0 0 0 0 0 0
By merging them, we hav e
M
1
s;m;p
ÆM
2
s;m;p
s m p
U
s;m;p
I(s) \ I(m) \ I(p) 1 1 1
I(s)
C
\ I(m) \ I(p) 0 1 1
I(s)
C
\ I(m)
C
\ I(p) 0 0 1
I(s)
C
\ I(m)
C
\ I(p)
C
0 0 0
to which we again apply zooming in from fs;m; pg to fs; pg:
M
1
s;m;p
ÆM
2
s;m;p
s m p I
fs;m;pg
fs;pg
M
3
s;p
s p
U
s;m;p
I(s)\I(m)\I(p) 1 1 1  ! U
s;p
I(s)\I(p) 1 1
I(s)
C
\I(m)\I(p) 0 1 1 Zooming in I(s)
C
\I(p) 0 1
I(s)
C
\I(m)
C
\I(p) 0 0 1 I(s)
C
\I(p)
C
0 0
I(s)
C
\I(m)
C
\I(p)
C
0 0 0
where M
3
s;p
= I
fs;m;pg
fs;pg
(M
1
s;m;p
ÆM
2
s;m;p
). Thus we hav e
M
3
s;p
j= [s]p (and thus M
3
s
; I(s) j= p:)
Hence, the process of BARBARA is performed on the basis of the following
combination of zooming in & out:
M
3
s;p
= I
fs;m;pg
fs;pg
(O
fm;pg
fs;m;pg
(M
1
m;p
) ÆO
fs;mg
fs;m;pg
(M
2
s;m
)):
Others can be similarly described.
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CELARENT (Zooming in) (Lower zooming in)
No m is p. M j= [m]:p P;m(M); I(m) j= :p I(m)  R
m
(I(p)
C
)
All s is m. M j= [s]m P; s(M); I(s) j= m I(s)  R
s
(I(m))
No s is p M j= [s]:p P; s(M); I(s) j= :p I(s)  R
s
(I(p)
C
)
DARII (Bottom-up) (Top-down)
All m is p. M j= [m]p P;m(M); I(m) j= p I(m)  R
m
(I(p))
Some s is m. M j= <s>m P; s(M); I(s) j= m I(s)  R
s
(I(m))
Some s is p M j= <s>p P; s(M); I(s) j= p I(s)  R
s
(I(p))
FERIO (Bottom-up) (Top-down)
No m is p. M j= [m]:p P;m(M); I(m) j= :p I(m)  R
m
(I(p)
C
)
Some s is m. M j= <s>m P; s(M); I(s) j= m I(s)  R
s
(I(m))
Some s is not p M j= <s>:p P; s(M); I(s) j= :p I(s)  R
s
(I(p)
C
)
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduced the two operations of 'zooming in and out' as
representing one aspect of granular computing in a logical setting and then
applied them in to a formulation of Aristotle's syllogism. In the forthcoming
paper, we are planning to extend it to predicative reasoning processes.
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